# Exploring the Relationship Between Regulatory Oversight and the Quality of External Audit Reports

Gage Simmons, Arielle Cooper, Felix Hayes

#### 1 Introduction

The quality of external audit reports represents a cornerstone of financial market integrity and investor confidence. While extensive literature has examined factors influencing audit quality, the specific relationship between regulatory oversight intensity and the qualitative dimensions of audit reporting remains underexplored. Traditional approaches have predominantly relied on binary compliance metrics or financial restatements as proxies for audit quality, neglecting the nuanced communicative aspects that determine the practical utility of audit reports for stakeholders. This research addresses this gap by developing a comprehensive framework for assessing audit report quality across multiple dimensions and examining how these dimensions respond to varying levels of regulatory oversight.

Regulatory oversight in auditing has evolved significantly since the implementation of major regulatory frameworks such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. However, the optimal intensity and design of such oversight remain subjects of ongoing debate among practitioners, regulators, and academics. Previous research has produced conflicting evidence regarding the effectiveness of intensified regulatory scrutiny, with some studies suggesting improved audit quality and others indicating potential unintended consequences such as increased conservatism or defensive auditing practices.

This study makes several distinctive contributions to the literature. First, we develop

a novel multi-dimensional quality assessment framework that moves beyond traditional compliance-based metrics to capture the communicative effectiveness of audit reports. Second, we employ computational linguistics techniques to quantify qualitative aspects of audit reporting that have previously resisted systematic measurement. Third, we examine the relationship between regulatory oversight and audit quality across multiple jurisdictions with varying regulatory philosophies, providing comparative insights that inform global regulatory policy discussions.

Our research addresses three primary questions: How do different dimensions of audit report quality respond to variations in regulatory oversight intensity? Is there an optimal level of regulatory intensity that maximizes audit report quality across multiple dimensions? How do jurisdictional differences in regulatory framework design influence the relationship between oversight and audit quality?

# 2 Methodology

## 2.1 Research Design and Data Collection

This study employs a mixed-methods research design combining quantitative analysis of regulatory metrics with computational text analysis of audit reports. We collected a comprehensive dataset comprising 2,500 external audit reports from publicly traded companies across three distinct regulatory jurisdictions: the United States, the European Union, and Singapore. These jurisdictions were selected to represent a spectrum of regulatory approaches, from the rules-based intensive oversight in the United States to the more principles-based frameworks in the EU and Singapore's hybrid approach.

The data spans a five-year period from 2018 to 2022, capturing variations in regulatory intensity within each jurisdiction over time. For each jurisdiction, we developed a Regulatory Intensity Index (RII) that incorporates multiple dimensions of oversight, including inspection frequency, enforcement actions, standard-setting activity, and resource allocation to regulatory bodies. The RII was calculated quarterly for each jurisdiction, allowing for temporal analysis of how changes in regulatory intensity correlate with audit

quality metrics.

Audit reports were obtained from corporate filings in respective regulatory databases, including EDGAR for U.S. companies, the European eJustice portal for EU companies, and the ACRA database for Singaporean companies. The dataset includes companies from multiple industry sectors and of varying sizes to ensure representativeness and control for potential confounding factors.

#### 2.2 Quality Assessment Framework

We developed a novel multi-dimensional framework for assessing audit report quality, moving beyond traditional binary compliance metrics. Our framework evaluates quality across five distinct dimensions:

Transparency measures the extent to which the audit report provides clear insights into the audit process, key judgments, and areas of focus. Clarity assesses the linguistic accessibility and organizational structure of the report. Comprehensiveness evaluates the coverage of relevant audit matters and the depth of discussion. Risk communication examines how effectively the report communicates audit risks and their implications. Forward-looking analysis measures the extent to which the report provides insights relevant to future periods.

Each dimension was operationalized through multiple indicators derived from computational text analysis. For transparency, we analyzed the presence and specificity of discussions regarding audit scope, methodology, and key audit matters. Clarity was measured using established readability metrics (Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog) adapted for financial reporting contexts. Comprehensiveness was assessed through topic modeling and coverage analysis of required reporting elements. Risk communication was evaluated through sentiment analysis and risk keyword density. Forward-looking analysis was measured through temporal reference analysis and future-oriented statement identification.

#### 2.3 Computational Linguistics Approach

We employed a sophisticated natural language processing pipeline to quantify the qualitative dimensions of audit reports. The pipeline included text preprocessing (tokenization, lemmatization, stop-word removal), feature extraction (TF-IDF, word embeddings), and dimension-specific analysis modules.

For topic modeling, we implemented a customized Latent Dirichlet Allocation approach trained on financial reporting corpora to identify and quantify discussion of key audit matters. Sentiment analysis utilized domain-specific lexicons developed for financial reporting contexts, avoiding the limitations of general-purpose sentiment dictionaries. Readability analysis incorporated financial reporting-specific adjustments to account for technical terminology that necessarily reduces traditional readability scores without necessarily impairing comprehension for intended audiences.

All computational models were validated through manual coding of a randomly selected subset of reports, with inter-coder reliability exceeding 0.85 for all quality dimensions. The validation process ensured that computational metrics accurately captured the conceptual constructs underlying each quality dimension.

### 2.4 Statistical Analysis

The relationship between regulatory oversight and audit quality was analyzed using multivariate regression models with fixed effects for company, industry, and time period. The models included controls for company size, complexity, profitability, and governance characteristics to isolate the effects of regulatory intensity. We employed instrumental variable approaches to address potential endogeneity concerns, using exogenous regulatory changes as instruments for regulatory intensity.

To identify potential non-linear relationships and optimal regulatory intensity thresholds, we implemented regression splines and threshold regression models. These approaches allowed us to test whether the relationship between regulatory oversight and audit quality follows a linear pattern or exhibits diminishing returns or even negative effects at high intensity levels.

Jurisdictional differences were analyzed through interaction effects and separate stratified analyses, examining how the relationship between regulatory intensity and audit quality varies across different regulatory framework designs.

#### 3 Results

# 3.1 Overall Relationship Between Regulatory Oversight and Audit Quality

Our analysis reveals a complex, non-linear relationship between regulatory oversight intensity and audit report quality. The initial findings indicate a positive association between regulatory intensity and audit quality across most dimensions, but this relationship exhibits significant curvature, suggesting diminishing marginal returns to additional regulatory scrutiny.

The transparency dimension shows the strongest positive response to increased regulatory intensity, with a correlation coefficient of 0.42 (p; 0.01) in the low-to-moderate intensity range. However, this relationship plateaus beyond a Regulatory Intensity Index value of 7.2 (on a 10-point scale), with additional regulatory intensity providing no further improvements in transparency and, in some cases, slight declines.

Clarity demonstrates a more nuanced relationship with regulatory intensity. Moderate levels of oversight correlate with improved clarity (r = 0.31, p; 0.05), but high intensity environments show a negative relationship (r = -0.28, p; 0.05), suggesting that excessive regulatory requirements may lead to overly complex or technical language that impairs readability.

Comprehensiveness shows a consistently positive relationship with regulatory intensity across the observed range (r = 0.38, p; 0.01), though the magnitude of improvement decreases at higher intensity levels. Risk communication exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship, with optimal levels occurring at moderate regulatory intensity and declines at both low and high extremes.

#### 3.2 Optimal Regulatory Intensity Thresholds

Our threshold regression models identify distinct optimal intensity levels for different quality dimensions. For overall audit quality (a composite measure of all five dimensions), the optimal Regulatory Intensity Index value is 6.8, with quality scores approximately 23

The transparency dimension peaks at an RII of 7.2, while clarity shows optimal levels at a lower intensity of 5.9. This divergence highlights the trade-offs between different quality dimensions and suggests that regulatory frameworks must balance competing objectives when designing oversight mechanisms.

Notably, the relationship between regulatory intensity and audit quality varies significantly by company size and complexity. For large, complex organizations, the optimal regulatory intensity is higher (RII = 7.4), while for smaller entities, moderate intensity levels (RII = 5.8) produce the best outcomes. This finding supports calls for differentiated regulatory approaches based on entity characteristics.

#### 3.3 Jurisdictional Variations

Comparative analysis across jurisdictions reveals important differences in how regulatory frameworks influence audit quality. The United States, with its rules-based intensive oversight, shows strong performance in transparency and comprehensiveness but relatively weaker performance in clarity and forward-looking analysis. The correlation between regulatory intensity and clarity is negative in the U.S. context (r = -0.41, p; 0.01), suggesting that the detailed specific requirements characteristic of U.S. regulation may impair communicative effectiveness.

The European Union's principles-based approach demonstrates different patterns, with stronger performance in clarity and forward-looking analysis but more variable performance in transparency. The relationship between regulatory intensity and quality is more linear in the EU context, with less evidence of diminishing returns at higher intensity levels.

Singapore's hybrid regulatory framework shows the most balanced performance across quality dimensions, with positive correlations between regulatory intensity and all quality

measures. However, the overall quality levels in Singapore remain slightly below those in the U.S. and EU, possibly reflecting resource constraints or the developing nature of its regulatory infrastructure.

These jurisdictional differences persist after controlling for company characteristics and economic conditions, suggesting that regulatory philosophy and framework design significantly influence how oversight intensity translates into audit quality.

#### 3.4 Time-Series Analysis

Longitudinal analysis reveals that the relationship between regulatory oversight and audit quality evolves over time. Initially, increases in regulatory intensity produce rapid improvements in audit quality, particularly in transparency and comprehensiveness. However, these improvements diminish over subsequent periods, suggesting that organizations adapt to regulatory requirements and that the marginal benefit of additional oversight decreases.

We observe particularly strong quality improvements following major regulatory changes, such as the implementation of new auditing standards or enforcement initiatives. However, these improvements are often followed by periods of stability or slight decline, supporting the concept of regulatory cycles where initial responsiveness gives way to adaptation and potential gaming of the system.

The time-series analysis also reveals lagged effects, with changes in regulatory intensity affecting audit quality with a delay of two to four quarters. This finding has important implications for regulatory evaluation, suggesting that assessment periods should extend beyond immediate implementation phases.

# 4 Conclusion

This research provides novel insights into the complex relationship between regulatory oversight and the quality of external audit reports. By developing a multi-dimensional quality assessment framework and employing computational linguistics techniques, we

move beyond traditional compliance-based metrics to capture the communicative effectiveness of audit reporting.

Our findings challenge simplistic narratives about regulatory oversight, demonstrating that more regulation does not necessarily equate to better audit quality. Instead, we identify optimal intensity thresholds beyond which additional oversight provides diminishing returns and may even impair certain quality dimensions. The non-linear relationships we document suggest that regulators should consider the marginal effects of oversight intensity rather than assuming linear improvements.

The jurisdictional variations we observe highlight the importance of regulatory design philosophy. Rules-based approaches appear effective for ensuring transparency and comprehensiveness but may compromise clarity and forward-looking analysis. Principles-based frameworks show opposite patterns, suggesting that optimal regulatory design may require balancing different philosophical approaches.

Several practical implications emerge from our findings. First, regulatory bodies should consider differentiated approaches based on entity size and complexity, as the optimal oversight intensity varies across organizational characteristics. Second, regulators should monitor multiple quality dimensions rather than focusing exclusively on compliance metrics, as improvements in one dimension may come at the cost of others. Third, our computational assessment framework provides a tool for ongoing monitoring of audit quality that could supplement traditional inspection-based approaches.

This study has several limitations that suggest directions for future research. Our analysis focuses on publicly available audit reports, potentially missing important interactions that occur during the audit process. The computational metrics, while validated, inevitably simplify complex qualitative constructs. Future research could incorporate additional data sources, such as inspection reports or auditor-client communications, to provide more comprehensive insights.

In conclusion, this research contributes to both academic understanding and practical regulatory policy by providing empirical evidence on the relationship between oversight intensity and audit quality across multiple dimensions and jurisdictions. The findings support a more nuanced approach to regulatory design that considers optimal intensity levels, trade-offs between quality dimensions, and the importance of regulatory philosophy in translating oversight into improved audit reporting.

#### References

Adams, B. K., Fischer, P. M. (2021). Regulatory intensity and financial reporting quality: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Accounting Research, 59(3), 845-887.

Chen, L., Watanabe, R. (2020). Computational linguistics in accounting research: Methods and applications. Accounting Horizons, 34(2), 145-167.

Davis, S. M., Thompson, G. H. (2019). Audit quality dimensions: Beyond the compliance paradigm. Auditing: A Journal of Practice Theory, 38(4), 23-47.

European Securities and Markets Authority. (2022). Audit quality in the European Union: A comparative analysis. ESMA Technical Report, 1-45.

Garcia, R., Lee, S. (2021). Non-linear effects of regulation on audit outcomes. Contemporary Accounting Research, 38(2), 1123-1158.

Johnson, M. P., Smith, K. L. (2020). Principles versus rules in audit regulation: International evidence. Journal of International Accounting Research, 19(1), 1-24.

Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. (2023). The state of audit quality 2022. PCAOB Research Report, 2023-1.

Roberts, A. B., Chen, H. (2019). Textual analysis of financial disclosures: Methods and validation. Review of Accounting Studies, 24(4), 1288-1322.

Singapore Accounting Standards Council. (2022). Audit quality framework implementation review. SASC Annual Report, 45-68.

Thompson, R. W., Martinez, E. (2021). Regulatory thresholds and audit quality: Evidence from natural experiments. The Accounting Review, 96(5), 345-372.